SECENT SHOURITY INFORMATION

Beview of this document of CI

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Special Assistant, Intelligence, Proposes the Following Change 1: 0(8)

(55-39)

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\*h. In the near future, the new Soviet leadership will almost certainly attempt to follow the foreign and domestic policies established during recent years. It will probably continue to emphasize unremitting hostility to the West (including the tactic of splitting the West), the enlargement of the Bloc economic base, and the increase of Bloc mili same power."

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determined to spread Soviet power, did not allow his ambitions to lead him into reckless courses of action an his foreign policy. It would be assafe to assume that the new Soviet regime will have Stalin's skill in avoiding general war. At least initially, the regime will also lack his freedom of action and his ability to maneuver, since it will not possess Stalin's immense prestige and authority. Specifically, in foreign policy, the new regime will probably find it more difficult to abandon positions than did Stalin and might feel itself compelled to react more strongly to wist-it regarded as if the new set of the West confronted it with the rect for major decisions. Conversely, the new leadership will probably exercise caution in taking action which it thought would force the West to take comparable decisions. If the West should suggest re-examination of the principal issues which have divided East and West, the new Soviet Covernment would probably adhere to established Soviet positions.

15. The death of Stalin removes an autocrat who, while ruthless and

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